We live in an age of scientific materialism. One of the signs of this philosophy is how the traditional Western idea of the soul has been submerged beneath the materialist premise that matter is the cause of life. Matter, somehow, brings life into being. We see this, for example, in the standard description of the origin of life given in biology textbooks. They assume that RNA and DNA appeared spontaneously, giving rise to the most primitive forms of living creatures. What caused RNA to suddenly appear they cannot say.
The view that life is caused by matter is a hypothesis. Although never proven, the theory permeates contemporary culture. For example, it is a staple of the science-fiction genre that machines, equipped with sophisticated computer-processing powers, will eventually become conscious. This is said to be plausible even though matter has never been brought to life, much less made conscious. Mary Shelley, author of the gothic novel Frankenstein, understood that if a new creature were to become conscious it would first have to be endowed with life. She had Dr. Frankenstein begin his experiments by regenerating dead tissue.
A more practical example of the materialist premise is seen in the claim that human consciousness reduces to electrochemical activity within the brain. When this activity diminishes, the mind begins to flicker and tends toward non-existence. When there is no measurable electrochemical activity at all, the patient is as good as dead.
The Catholic philosophical tradition holds that life is not caused by matter, but that the soul gives life to the body. This view stands in direct contradiction to the materialist premise. The life of the body is not reducible to matter but exists as an immaterial (or spiritual) entity that has its own inherent powers. St. Thomas Aquinas holds that the human soul is unique among forms of life because it has its own act of existence given directly by God.
Under this view, the soul remains fully present within the body despite the absence of any externally observable electrochemical activity. The inability to communicate is not the result of the loss of mind but is because the injured brain makes it impossible for the soul to display its powers of will and intellect. A brain-injured patient who gives no externally measurable signs of consciousness is still a person. The body is injured, but not the soul. The soul is not material, so it remains unaffected by injuries to the body. This general immunity from physical harm is why Catholic philosophers conclude that the soul survives death.
The clinical approach to patients with disorders of consciousness will be vastly different under these two understandings. Given the materialistic premise, the absence of electrochemical activity in the brain is a sign that the person either no longer exists or has a life that is equivalent to nonexistence. Such persons can be disregarded. They are empty shells. There is nothing within that merits the necessity of our consideration or care.
Under the Catholic view, the soul continues to enliven the body, but unfortunately it is a body that is profoundly injured and that therefore blocks the soul from displaying its presence within. This patient cannot be treated with disregard because he continues to be a substantial union of body and rational soul. The family and medical staff therefore have an obligation to treat this patient with the same measure of respect as they would any other person. Thus, the Catholic philosophy demands a completely different response to the brain-injured patient from that which follows from the materialistic premise.
EDWARD J. FURTON, PH.D.,is director of publications for the National Catholic Bioethics Center in Philadelphia and is among its team of seven ethicists. He is editor-in-chief of NCBC’s award-winning National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly and Ethics & Medics.